INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been enjoying an incredible GDP growth rate of 9-10% per annum. Notwithstanding the current massive global economic downturn (i.e., the Economist Intelligence Unit expects real GDP growth to slow sharply to just 6% in 2009), such an unbridled economic growth has alleviated millions of people out of poverty but is taxing the planet. China is home to 16 of the 20 most polluted cities on earth (World Bank, 2001 ).
The PRC government has set the goal of striving for a harmonious 'Xiaokang' Society by the year 2020. In achieving the goal of developing national economy and protecting ecological environment whilst maintaining social equity, China will need to quadruple its gross national product (GNP) of 2000. This will cause enormous challenges in managing depletion of natural resources and environmental pollution.
As the most populous nation on earth with an insatiable appetite for natural resources to boost its economic growth, therefore the Chinese State has a prominent role in solving global environmental challenges (Diener and Rowe, 2007) .
In response to the severity of its environmental problems, China has enacted and implemented a series of policies, principles, regulations and laws since the 1970s.
Certain strategic policies such as the legally mandated environmental standards can coercively be imposed upon business enterprises. The State regulatory regime has been perceived by Chinese managers to be the most influential, most complex, and least predictable on organisational performance (Tan and Litschert 1994) . Hence, it is imperative to understand senior managers' perceptions of 'Coercive Government Institutional Involvements' that emerged as one of the major influencing factors in corporate environmental initiatives (Rowe and Guthrie, 2007) .
The paper is structured as follows: the following Section two provides a brief background of the Chinese Government's management of environmental degradation, followed in Section 3 by the rationale for utilising the chosen research methodology to explore senior managers' perceptions of corporate environmental management (CEM) . Section 4 provides the findings from this empirical study about the 'Coercive Government Institutional Involvements' that emerged. Section 5 provides a discussion and the paper concludes in Section 6 with some implications and recommendations for future research.
BACKGROUND
The 1972 In recent years, the "Cleaner Production Promotion Act" was enacted requiring industrial enterprises to implement cleaner production for environmental improvement (Guo 2005 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To investigate senior managers' perception of the emerging phenomenon of CEM in Shanghai, constructivist ontology was chosen using a modified grounded research approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990; 1994; Whiteley 2004 From the assumptions of constructivism ontology, the appropriate epistemology is therefore interpretivist (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln and Guba 2000) . The 'realities' presented by the respondents must be interpreted and understood (verstehen), rather than empirically measured, and explained (erklären).
Multiple case study method was the research strategy that facilitated the understanding of the dynamics of the senior managers' response to CEM within their organisational case settings. The case context allowed the researcher to use 'controlled opportunism' to respond flexibly to discoveries made in collecting emerging data (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Eisenhardt 1989 p. 539) . Whilst case studies can combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations, and the evidence may be qualitative (e.g., words), quantitative (i.e., numbers) or both, this study focused on qualitative (e.g., text, interview and observation) evidence, which was collected in interaction with senior managers.
This multiple case study method had been guided by grounded research approach using systematic data preparation and management (Strauss and Corbin 1990; 1994; Whiteley 2004) . A grounded research approach "is a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in the data systematically gathered and analysed.
Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection" (Strauss and Corbin 1994 p. 273) .
Whilst a modified version of the original grounded theory was adopted for this exploratory study, the basic framework was kept in terms of allowing important responses to emerge the case studies institutionalised settings. This allowed the sifting and analysis of a large amount of data in non-standard and unpredictable formats. office in Beijing "company managers are a key target group of major importance to the environmental situation in China" (Hebel 2003, forward) .
The interviews were a way of tapping the thoughts of subjects and examining how they each perceived the reality of CEM and the meaning that they construed around that. In order to reflect the diversity of companies in Shanghai, the fifteen organisational cases selected for this research were of different types and sizes.
The interviews were audio taped (whenever possible) and field notes were immediately documented within 24 hours, so as not to lose the vital nuances and cues observed. The taped interviews were transcribed and rigorously reviewed for errors by both the researchers and Chinese translators. Tapes were carefully listened to following the Strauss and Corbin (1990) framework, and corrections were made. The trustworthiness of transcripts was carefully assessed following Poland's (1995) methods.
Only the views of the most senior managers/executives of each of the organisations were taken into account for each case (unless contrary views by majority of managers prevailed), while the data gathered from the rest of the managers (within the same enterprise) took on a supportive role. Hence, prolonged engagement added to the rigour and trustworthiness of the data collected in Shanghai (Lincoln and Guba1985) .
Full details of the research methods, samples and the interviews are explained in detail in Rowe and Guthrie (2007) . This paper uses part of the empirics from the wider study to specifically examine the issue of coercive government institutional involvements in CEM as perceived by senior managers in Shanghai. (Rowe 2008 ) that is perceived to influence CEM surfaced from some of the following quotations 3 by participants.
COERCIVE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENTS
// The government is not doing enough to solve environmental degradation problems // Chinese government appears to be reactive rather than proactive to environmental degradation problems // The government may pressure other enterprises to consider environmental protection policies // government is seen to be implementing its environmental policies // it is a national issue, macro policy // the governments have financial problems, not enough funds to solve environmental problems // the government is aware but because of the short of funds, cannot afford big scale environmental protection // under a wise government, the state, we can do it // we know that the government's policy has a long term plan. It considers environmental protection at the same time as development takes place. // As highlighted from these selected quotations, there were recurrent emphases on the influence of government institutional involvements in CEM. (Ferris and Zhang, 2002) . Besides, foreign invested enterprises are seen as having the finance to install and operate appropriate environmental controls (interviews #11, #10, #12 and #16).
Preferred Environmental Strategies
Also, results reported in this paper indicated that senior managers and executives preferred solutions for China's environmental problems ranged from the command and control strategy of government's coercive regulatory instruments (60% of organisations), to a strategy of using communicative instruments such as public awareness education (53%) and market based incentives such as user taxes and tradable permits (40%). Extracts of some of these quotations from which these findings were derived are stated as follows:
// Perhaps, imposing greater penalties and increasing resource prices, e.g., In conclusion, the findings of our in-depth investigation were similar to the results of another study (Fryxell and Lo 2002) in regards to respondents' preferences for the 'command and control' regulatory instruments to curtail environmental degradation in China. In a survey of managerial preferences for policy mechanisms used to address environmental problems, managers from Beijing, Dalian and Guangzhou favoured regulatory instruments, placing less faith in communicative and market instruments (Fryxell and Lo 2002) .
DISCUSSION
Findings from this study indicating the key role of the States institutional involvement in environmental management is not surprising. Governments play a prominent institutional role in CEM practices and are referred to in both institutional and environmental research (e.g., Berman et al. 1999; Hoffman 2001; Shrivastava 1995) .
Government institutional bodies are able to establish laws that bind organizations to certain practices and procedures. Andrews (1998) , in a survey of Fortune 500 CEOs in 1995, found that coercive legal requirements and public perceptions (i.e., reputations) were most important in driving environmental business strategy.
It is evident from this study and rooted in the literature (e.g., Green and Yip 1993; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Ross 1994; Zhang 1997 ) that China has a significant environmental legislation in place that has been developed in the last two decades.
China's constitution (Article 9) establishes the State's duty to conserve natural resources and wildlife, and Article 10 establishes the duty of persons and organizations to ensure rational land use (Ma and Ortolano 2000) . China's "sophisticated set of regulatory programs" (Ma and Ortolano, 2000, p. 8 ) and the lack of stringent enforcement of environmental laws and rules has been widely cited by various authors (e.g., Ferris and Zhang 2002; Green and Yip 1993; Ross 1994; Stover 2000; Tang et al. 1997; Zhang and Wen 2008) .
According to institutional theory, (Oliver 1991; Tolbert and Zucker 1983) penalties and fines for non-compliance behaviour do not daunt organizations if government enforcement of environmental protection regulations and rules are perceived to be weak. This is attributable to companies' reluctance to conform to environmental protection regulations when these rules and regulations are not widely diffused and accepted as the norm. Hence, corporations are less likely to mimic 'best practices' in CEM.
Enforcement of environmental rules on polluting enterprises such as the SOEs were found to be problematic in this study and this lends support to the literature (Ma and Ortolano 2000; Wong and Chan 1996) . There were economic, environmental and social implications in closing down these polluting Chinese SOEs, as they were traditionally responsible for paying retirement pensions and for providing workers with housing, health care and other social supports. This legacy of the "iron rice bowl" concept regarding lifetime employment expected by many SOEs workers still persisted late last century (Hughes 2002; Whiteley et al. 2000, p. 9) , although to a lesser degree in contemporary China.
However, the large iconic listed SOEs are seen to be actively engaging in CEM and The SEPA estimated that at the beginning of the century, Chinese industry was a primary source of pollution, accounting for about 40% of the nation's water pollution and about 80% of its air pollution (Wang et al. 2004 In general, potentials for enforcement problems stem from the fact that municipal environmental protection authorities are mainly responsible for environmental enforcement activities in China. However, they are often less responsive to State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) than to the local governments, who frequently are major shareholders of polluting SOEs, creating an inherent conflict of interest (interview #11; Green and Yip 1993; Stover 2000) . Many local governments are also concerned about unemployment that will result if they close down polluting factories or mines. Some localities may even ignore the environmental laws altogether as the traditional Chinese proverb goes: "heaven is high and the emperor is far away." Zhang et al, (1999) attribute this weak enforcement of environmental policies and regulations to insufficient incentives and inadequate resources (e.g., funding and technology) for polluting enterprises to improve their environmental practices and for the authorities to compel these organisations to comply. The SEPA officials noted that a major obstacle to enforcement involves the large, financially weak SOEs, which are among the worst polluters, with outdated equipments and insufficient resources to modernize or implement pollution control .
To help understand the implementation gap between the good intentions of Chinese State institutional involvement (through macro environmental policies, compliance, monitoring and enforcement), and weak compliance due to lack of efficient monitoring and enforcement of environmental policies and laws, institutional constraints as a theoretical concept has been used to explain this phenomenon (Tang et al. 1997; Tsai and Child 1997) . As explained above, institutional theory is a plausible explanation for the resistance to widespread CEM in Shanghai. Institutional theoretical constraints explain in part, why China's "sophisticated set of regulatory programs" (Ma and Ortolano, 2000, p. 8) , did not translate to overall CEM.
Undisputedly, the Chinese government's past regulatory strategies have increased its effort to clean up the country's air, land, water and in attempting to prevent further environmental degradation. However, until CEM becomes an institutional 'norm' in doing business and is widely embraced by industry, most organisations will continue to accept the status quo -business as usual scenario for CEM.
CONCLUSION
This paper reports on an empirical study grounded in senior managers' perceptions of However, the empirical findings from the interviews and observations suggest that the government's enforcement of compliance to environmental protection regulations appears to be spatial and ineffective. Hence, organisations in Shanghai were not deterred by the sanctions for non-compliance behaviour. For that reason, leading edge CEM activities might not be swiftly imitated or embraced. Thus, for organisations in emerging nations such as China, the institutional norm in environmental protection among most corporations is to adopt the "business as usual" scenario.
In the current study, senior executives in Shanghai advocated the following preferred environmental strategies to encourage CEM: greater government's coercive regulatory instruments (60% of companies); better communicative instruments such as greater transparency, public awareness education and media (53%); and market based incentives such as user taxes and tradable permits (40%). The findings echo several authors' suggestions that whilst governments play the dominant role in the formal institutional mechanism of environmental management, it can be enhanced through market promotion and public participation Zhang and Wen 2008) .
However, there are certain limitations that need to be noted. The study is limited to an investigation of CEM in Shanghai, but the implications of this exploratory research is that environmental management systems and standards that work in developed nations should not be directly transplanted to developing nations without considering institutional contexts.
Emanating from this study where the government is the major institutional actor, future research would heighten our understanding as to whether the process of initiating a shift towards environmental sustainability differs from the more developed economies. The results of the PRC government's institutional impact on CEM, including its formal environmental laws and rules that influence (or constrain) the actions of business enterprises and managers within these institutions, form the foundation upon which future studies can be expanded.
As can be observed from this study, the magnitude of China's environmental challenges will make this most populous nation on earth a vast market for environmental management opportunities such as environmental technology, services and products. Meeting these environmental challenges will be economically and socially daunting. Nevertheless, as expressed by one senior manager of a SOE who concluded that: "under a wise government, the State, we can do it" (interview #21).
